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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the interaction of monetary, ﬁscal and wage
policies and their eﬀects on prices in a Monetary Union (MU). The model
shows that, relative to the one country case, in a MU ﬁscal activism
is always bigger and the capacity of the Central bank to keep inﬂation
close to targets is much smaller. Furthermore, the common monetary
policy has potentially asymmetric eﬀects, that depend on the size of the
diﬀerent countries in the union and the structure of the national wage
setting process.
The good news for monetary unions is that ﬁscal constraints on the na-
tional ﬁscal budgets are eﬀective in re-establishing monetary dominance.
They also ensure an ex-post policy mix of stability-oriented monetary
and ﬁscal policies and moderate wage inﬂation. Some convergence in the
structure of labor markets may, however, still be necessary.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The much discussed ﬁscal criteria in the Stability and Growth Pact come from
fears that the EMU may increase ﬁscal activism. Two arguments are usually
set forth in the debate to support this position, namely opportunistic behavior
by national governments and the need for coping with structural diﬀerences at
the national level.
Surprisingly, the study of the strategic behaviour of policymakers is normally
limited to ﬁscal authorities and federal central bank (CB), with no reference to
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1the third important determinant of inﬂation and unemployment, the behavior
of national wage setters.
In this paper, I examine the interaction of monetary, ﬁscal and wage policies
and their eﬀects on prices in a Monetary Union (MU) hit by economic shocks.
I show that ﬁscal activism is related with both entry in MU and with structural
diﬀerences in the national labour markets, and I analyse in detail the eﬀect
of both factors. The inclusion of labour markets allows me to deal with some
questions that are central in the agenda of both politicians and economists. The
traditional result that entry in a monetary union increases the incentives to the
use of discretionary ﬁscal policy is reinforced by the explicit inclusion of unions;
as a consequence, ﬁscal contraints on government deﬁcits appear essential in
a MU when the wage component is taken into due consideration. I also show
that diﬀerent structures of national labour markets make monetary policy more
diﬃcult in a MU than in the one country case, therefore some harmonization of
labour markets between participants countries to a MU may be necessary.
More speciﬁcally, this paper argues that :
• First and most important, ﬁscal activism is always increased by entry in
MU. This conclusion does not depend on any switch in preferences, and
should be considered as an inevitable fact for any country joining a MU.
• The capacity of the Central bank to keep inﬂation close to targets without
continuous interventions is much smaller in a MU than in the one country
case. Furthermore, the model shows that the unique monetary policy can
lead to very diﬀerent price dynamics in diﬀerent countries of the union. A
conservative central bank can reduce but not eliminate this problem.
• The eﬀects of the common monetary policy are inﬂuenced by the structure
of the national wage setting process. The model shows that some conver-
gence in the structure of labor markets may therefore be necessary. As
in Calmfors and Driﬃl (), decentralized wage bargaining produces higher
wage inﬂation and unemployment in the country and should not be en-
couraged.
• The good news for central banks of monetary unions is that ﬁscal con-
straints on the national ﬁscal budgets are eﬀective in re-establishing mon-
etary dominance. They also ensure an ex-post policy mix of stability-
oriented monetary policy, sustainable ﬁscal policies and moderate wage
inﬂation.
• From the methodological point of view, the paper takes into account the
structural break of the EMU and provides an analytical and conceptual
framework for assessing the potential causes for asymmetry in a MU.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents and describes in
d e t a i lt h em o d e l .T h es o l u t i o no ft h eg a m eb e t w e e nﬁscal, monetary and wage-
setting authorities is provided in section 3, both with explicit expectations and
with backward induction. Section 4 presents the main results and deals with
the policy implications of the model. Finally, section 5 summarizes the ﬁndings.
22 The model
2.1 Description of the model
The model is a one-shot game. My choice of a game theory model is motivated
by the relevance of the Lucas critique in the context of the paper. One important
implication of the Lucas critique is that any structural change in a part of an
economc system also changes the behaviour of all other agents. In the case of
a Monetary Union, the transfer of monetary policy at a supra-national level
implies that one cannot expect the unions and the government to behave in
the same way, even if they are exactly the same as before and so are their
preferences. I consider a Barro-Gordon (1983) type of model and concentrate
on a country belonging to a monetary union. Some basic hypotheses of the
model are described here.
I assume some structural parameters of labour markets as given, because
there are no signs of a very rapid change of the national labour market as a
consequence of the EMU, and even less of the creation of an EU-wide labour
market.
The model focuses on stabilization of the cycle, not on sistematic biases.
Therefore, I assume that the the long run targets are agreed among the diﬀerent
players and the tastes diﬀer on stabilization only. Even under this optimistic
scenario the dynamics are quite rich, and several problems arise.
The central bank of a monetary union reacts to union-wide economic in-
dicators, and its actions may propagate shocks to one country to the others.
Similarly, ﬁscal policy has spillovers on neighbouring countries. I am neglecting
both monetary and ﬁscal externalities in order to to allow a simple treatment
of the strategic interaction of the players. For a paper taking into account the
“Domino eﬀect”1 of ﬁscal policies caused by monetary externalities, see Ono-
rante (2002).
In the model, both workers’ unions and ﬁscal authorities have a larger pref-
erence for output stabilization than the Central Bank. I believe this hypotesis
is justiﬁed in Europe by the statute of the ECB. To ensure a simpler model I
assume that the governments have totally delegated the objective of inﬂation
satbilization to the central bank. This parametrization is not restrictive, as its
relaxation does not alter the qualitative results of the model.
Shocks are, by deﬁnition, surprises. They are hard to observe, they never
come with a label (supply, demand), even econometricians have problems in
identifying them ex post. On the other hand, macro variables like output are
directly observable, and one can reasonably assume that public institutions have
information from the departments of statistics in advance on the general public.
I chose therefore to use a reduced form description of the economies and to
impose an observable shock to the output level. This choice is not mainstream
and it complicates slightly the notation, but I think it is easier to justify.
In order to limit the complexity of the formulas, I will focus on the case
which is most perceived to be problematic: an asymmetric shock to output that
1XXX Domino eﬀect of ﬁscal policies
3cannot be dealt with by the common monetary policy.
The common monetary policy is decided by a federal Central Bank (CB).
T h eC Bi si n t e r e s t e di nu n i o n - w i d ei n ﬂation ˜ p and (possibly) output ˜ y, both




LCB =(˜ p2 + β˜ y2) (1)
The parameter β expresses the relative aversion of the CB to inﬂation and
unemployment.
The CB chooses a union-wide policy variable ˜ r, such as a nominal inter-
est rate, after observing the deviations from targets of inﬂation and output
of the whole union. Variables with a tilda denote union-wide aggregates. A
union-wide variable is deﬁn e da st h ew e i g h t e ds u mo ft h ec o r r e s p o n d i n gn a -
tional variables with the weights φ denoting the size of each country in the MU:
˜ x = Σiφixi,{φi : Σiφi =1 }
The national ﬁscal policy is decided by the government, seeking to min-
imize a loss function including national (without tilda) output y and deﬁcit g
arising from discretionary ﬁscal policy:
min
g LG =( y2 + γg2) (2)
conditional to the observed shocks and wage policies, and backward induct-
ing on the CB. The parameter γ expresses the relative preference for deﬁcit
stabilization. The target variable p is not included because the goal of price
stability has been assigned to the CB for the whole union. I will explicitely
model only one country, with weight φ in the MU.
The national wages are determined as the outcome of a decentralized bar-
gaining process. For tractability, I suppose that in the country there are 1/ψ
identical unions, each of them representing a fraction ψ of workers. Each union
j =1 ,2,..1/ψ minimizes a loss function of the form
min
wj
LUj =( y2 + ω(wj − p)
2) (3)
including deviations from target unemployment y and real wage inﬂation (wj−p)
of the workers it represents. The collective outcome (symmetric Nash Equi-
librium) of the decentralized wage negotiation is the level of wages w in the
country:
w = Σjψjwj (4)
= wj ∀j
4The national macro variables (inﬂation and output) are linearly related
to the output shock (η), the growth rate of wages (w) and the policy instruments
(g,˜ r). Some prices are set in advance, therefore the aggregate supply curve is
upward sloping. As a consequence, monetary, ﬁscal, and wage policies aﬀect
output and inﬂation by moving aggregate demand:
y = g − ˜ r − λw − η (5)
p = g − ˜ r + λw
where ˜ r i st h eu n i o n - w i d ei n t e r e s tr a t ec h o s e nb yt h eC B ,g is the ﬁscal policy
stance of the national government, w is the national wage level, η an observable
shock to revenue and λ < 1 is a structural parameter describing the eﬀect of
wage inﬂa t i o no np r i c ei n ﬂation. Appendix A shows that the equations are
compatible with a standard AS-AD model.
The assumption that ﬁscal and monetary policy are perfect substitutes fol-
lows Nordhaus (1994). The assumption is obviously a simpliﬁcation and ignores
relevant second order eﬀects such as the diﬀerent eﬀect that ﬁscal and monetary
policy have on interest rates, exchange rates, and sectoral prices. However, I
have shown in a previous paper that a more general setup would not change the
qualitative conclusions.
T h eo r d e ro ft h em o v e s has been chosen in a way that most reﬂects the
actual setup of the EMU. In a game between unions, ﬁscal and monetary au-
thorities, the participants come to some understanding of the strategy of the
others. As a consequence, at each step of the game the players will take as given
the preceding decisions and form expectations (backward induct) on the follow-
ing ones. I will then discard the simplest case, the Nash Equilibrium, in which
each authority takes as given the decisions of the others, because I consider it
little more than a theoretical case.
Instead, I chose the following order of the moves: the shock η comes obviously
ﬁrst, the workers’ unions determine (each of them playing Nash to the others)
the national wage level w, then the national ﬁscal policy g is decided, ﬁnally
the CB observes the union-wide aggregates and chooses ˜ r accordingly.
T h ec h o i c eo fl e t t i n gt h eC Bm o v el a s ti sq u i t ec o m m o ni nt h el i t e r a t u r e ,a n d
easy to justify2. First, in most MUs monetary policy makers have a coherent
and understandable strategy that explicitly depends on macro variables, while
ﬁscal policy tends to be more erratic and depend on elections, personalities and
coalitions, but hardly on moral suasion by the CB. Also, monetary policy is fast
in reacting to external changes in the economy, including changes in the ﬁscal
stance of member states, while ﬁscal policy is the result of a long process of
negotiation by policymakers and hardly qualiﬁes as a variable that the CB can
directly inﬂuence in the short run.
2This is often referred to in the literature as ﬁscal dominance. Monetary dominance of a
single central bank over many ﬁscal authorities in a monetary union is even less realistic than
the Nash Equilibrium. In the EMU, monetary dominance is ensured by the SGP.
5The choice of letting the unions play before the ﬁscal authority comes from
similar considerations: ﬁrst, there may be (and normally there are) many unions
in a country, and their reactions are therefore more diﬃcult to anticipate than
those of the ﬁscal policy to an increase in unemployment. Second, wages are
normally determined for many years and the contracting process is much more
dispersed and slower than the one leading to ﬁscal policy.
3 Solution of the model
3.1 The role of expectations
The Central Bank reacts to the eﬀect on union-wide variables. In case of a
asymmetric shock in a country with weight φ ∈ (0,1] the aggregate variables
react as:
˜ y = φ(g − λw − η) − ˜ r (6)
˜ p = φ(g + λw) − ˜ r
Solving the Central Bank’s minimization problem gives the following expres-
sion for r:
˜ r = φ(g + α1λw − α2η) (7)
with α1 =
(1−β)
1+β , α2 =
β
1+β. The interest rate is decreased in the event of a
negative output shock unless the CB is a pure inﬂation targeter (β =0 )a n di s
always increased in response of a ﬁscal expansion. The response to an increase
in the wage level is theoretically ambiguous, but positive for normal values of
the parameters (β < 1), that is unless the CB cares more about output that
about prices. Finally, the reaction of the CB is proportional to the size of the
country in the MU.
The national government targets the national aggregates
y = g − ˜ re − λw − η (8)
p = g − ˜ re + λw




(˜ re + λw + η) (9)
The ﬁscal authority faces a cost in changing the ﬁscal stance. Hence, the
multiplicator outside the parentheses is less than one, and decreasing in γ, the
parameter that indicates the cost of discretionary ﬁscal policy moves. The ﬁscal
policy stance is eased if a negative shock hits the economy, in order to compen-
sate for the additional unemployment coming from an excessive wage inﬂation,
or to smooth the domestic real eﬀects of an expected monetary tightening.
6Finally, wages are set by unions playing Nash with each other. The Nash
equilibrium describes the solution under no cooperation: each union in the
country plays as if the other unions had decided their wages already. As a
consequence, the eﬀects of a wage increase on macroeconomic variables perceived
by the average union are given by λψ: the smaller the size ψ of the union, the
less the eﬀect of a wage increase on prices and unemployment will be taken into
consideration.
y =( ge − ˜ re) − λψw − η (10)
p =( ge − ˜ re)+λψw
the resulting wage inﬂation is
w =
(ω − ωλψ + λψ)(ge − ˜ re) − λψη
(λψ − 1)
2 ω +( λψ)
2 (11)
3.2 Results with Backward Induction
This section shows the solution of the model when the expectations are formed
by backward induction. The CB moves last, after observing the moves of all the
other players:
˜ r = φ(˜ g + α1λ˜ w − α2˜ η) (12)
For all possible values of φ (excluding 1) the federal central bank lowers the
interest rates in response to a negative shock and increases them in response to
wage inﬂation and public deﬁcit. The size of the intervention is proportional to
φ.
The Government observes η and w and backward inducts on the ECB. Sub-
stituting (12) into the expectations of (9) one obtains the expression for ﬁscal
policy:
g =( 1− φ)




For all possible values of φ (excluding 1) the backward inducting government
eases ﬁscal stance in response to both a negative shock and an increase in
nominal wages.
The unions backward induct on both CB and government, therefore (12) and
(13) are substituted into (11) in order to obtain the expression for the wages:
w =
¡
1 − 2φ + φα2γ + φ
2¢
ωB +( −φα2γ + γ)A
³
(1 − φ)
2 + γ + λψ
³
γ (φα1 − 1) − 2(φ − 1)
2´´
















Equations (12,13 and 14) constitute the complete solution of the model with
backward induction. In order to get a better intuition of its economic implica-
tions, the next section highlights some speciﬁci s s u e s .
4 Results and policy implications
4.1 Entering the monetary union
Before entering the MU, the country can be thought of as belonging to a MU
with itself only. The outcomes are thus described by (14) and (13) under the
assumption that φ =1 .
w =
(1+ λψ (α1 − 1))α2ω +( α2 − 1)λψ (1 + α1)
(1 + λψ (α1 − 1))
2 ω +( λψ)
2 (1 + α1)
2 η (15)
g =0
˜ p =( 1 − α1)λw + α2η
Comparing the previous equations with (13), one can immediately see that the
structure of policy interaction diﬀers fundamentally. Before entering the MU,
the national central bank is always able to “discipline” ﬁscal policy according
to its own preferences (in this case, g =0 ). An even stronger result holds:
if the national central bank is a pure inﬂation targeter, both government and
wage setters have to adapt their policy in such a way that the inﬂation target is
attained. This result follows from equations (15), where β =0(pure inﬂation
targeting) implies α1 =1 , α2 =0 . Substituting into the third equation, one
obtains ˜ p =0 . Neither result holds after entrance in the MU, and both ﬁscal
and monetary targets are missed after a shock.
One can conclude that, despite the agreement of the long run targets between
the diﬀerent authorities, the statement of Dixit and Lambertini (2000 a,b,c)
that “ﬁscal discretion destroys monetary commitment” is conﬁrmed even in
the short-run perspective of this paper. The deﬁcit bias is exacerbated in a
monetary union, where every individual country is tempted to take advantage
of the common monetary policy by running deﬁcits with much of the costs in
terms of higher interest rates aﬀecting the other member countries. The new
element is that the wage setters internalize the new ﬁscal behavior in their
expectations and tend to exploit the new framework in a similar way, further
increasing the incentives to the use of discretional ﬁscal policy.
4.2 Size of the country and structural diﬀerences
The complexity and non linearity of the expressions for the variance of ﬁscal
policy and prices make the close-form solution (12,13,14) cumbersome. Thus,
8I prefer a graphical representation. Figure << variance of ﬁscal interventions
after a unit shock>> illustrates the average ﬁscal expansion after a negative
output shock for all values of φ and ψ. The other parameters have been chosen
in order to illustrate the results, diﬀerent values have been tried and they do
not change the qualitative conclusions. The color of the surface depends on the
value of the data point, and two lighter bands have been imposed at φ =1and
φ =0 .1 to highlight respectively the one country case and the average-sized
member of a monetary union.
• <<variance of ﬁscal interventions after a unit shock>>
The results for the one country case (equation 15) are conﬁrmed by the
simulation: for every level of centralization of wage bargaining, the CB is able
to fully control the ﬁscal policy, and the variability is then zero. When the
country enters the monetary union (lighter band at φ =0 .1)t h i se ﬀect of
discipline is maintained only if the wage bargaining is centralized (ψ =1 )s o
that wage setters internalize the eﬀect on prices of higher wages. The more the
wage is determined by decentralized bargaining, the more ﬁscal policy intervenes
actively to oﬀset the unemployment that arises as externality.
• <<variance of prices after a unit shock>>
The results on price variability are consistent with the previous ﬁndings. In
the one country case, the variance of prices is extremely limited (see again the
φ =1lighter stripe). In a monetary union, two diﬀerent forces drive the prices:
on the one hand, ﬁscal policy takes advantage of the reduced capacity of the
central bank to respond, and this increases the prices. On the other hand, a
centralized wage setting is able to limit the inﬂation of wages (and thus prices)
accordingly, while this is not true of decentralized bargaining. The interaction
of these two forces produc e st h eu - s h a p e ds t r i p ea tφ =0 .1.T h e v a r i a n c e i s
minimal when the two forces oﬀset each other, maximal if wages are reduced
(one union, ψ =1 )or ﬁscal policy is expanded in order to preserve employment
after a high wage increase (ψ =0 ) .
4.3 Which type of federal central bank?
In the model a country belonging to a monetary union knows that the central
bank targets only aggregate quantities, and is ready to take advantage of the
opportunity to free ride when possible. The result that in a MU the central
bank cannot fully control the development of prices should not, however, lead
to the conclusion that the proﬁle of the CB is irrelevant. The CB can “present
itself to the public” as belonging to one of three types: a “soft” central bank
uses an active Taylor rule, including both inﬂation and unemployment in its
objective function (β > 0); a “hard CB” is a pure inﬂation targeter (β =0 );
the CB is “passive” if monetary policy is taken as given by the other players
9(φ =0 ).3 This last image of the bank is the one the ECB is trying to give to
the outside (cfr. Issing). As a matter of fact, a pure inﬂation targeter can be
s h o w nt ob ep r e f e r a b l et oa’ p a s s i v eC B ’ .
Figure <<taylor rule vs pure inﬂation targeting>> compares the “soft”
central bank (β > 0) with the pure inﬂation targeter (β =0 ). The plot is
the absolute diﬀerence in the variance of prices, the colors highlight when the
variance is smaller in the case of an active central bank (white color) or in the
case of pure inﬂation targeting (dark areas).
• <<taylor rule vs pure inﬂation targeting>>
The picture shows the fundamental role played by the labour market. When
wage contacting is strongly decentralized (ψ close to zero), a central bank com-
mitted to “punish” the inﬂationary eﬀe c to fe x c e s s i v ew a g e sa l w a y so b t a i n sal o w
variance of inﬂation. This is not always true if the labor market is centralized
enough.
The role of φ is also extremely important: in the one country case (φ =
1 , far away edge of the graph), there are many values of ψ for which the
central bank can target both inﬂation and unemployment. The case is diﬀerent
i naM U( φ small , near edge of the graph), because the ineﬃciencies of a
decentralized labor market are multiplied by the opportunistic behavior of the
ﬁscal authorities. Pure inﬂation targeting appears then to be the best option
to reduce the variability of inﬂation for almost all labor market structures.
Incidentally, the gain is biggest in absolute values for those countries whose φ
lies between 10 and 20 per cent (like many countries belonging to the EMU).
The ﬁnal question is whether the CB should try to persuade the national
governments to consider its policy as given, or whether it should cultivate the
image of a strict inﬂation targeter. Picture <<inﬂation targeting vs inaction>>
provides a clear-cut answer to this question by showing the diﬀerence in price
variance obtained under the two regimes. The darker area highlights the points
in which the diﬀerence is close to zero, all the other values are negative.
• <<inﬂation targeting vs inaction>>
As expected, a very small country (near edge of the graph) is indiﬀerent
between the two regimes, because the central bank does not react to its domestic
variables in any case. Another narrow indiﬀerence set is located around the value
of ψ in which the eﬀects of ﬁscal and wages policies exactly oﬀset each other.
Its exact location depends on the speciﬁc parametrization of the simulation. In
every other case, inﬂation targeting is strictly superior to inaction in the control
of inﬂation variability.
A general conclusion could be that the central bank of a MU does not have
the same choice that a national central bank would face. The possibility of
free riding by the national governments and the incapacity of the CB to target
3Another way to deﬁne the passive monetary policy is to say that the CB acts as if the
country had weight zero in the union. Since the reaction is proportional to the size of the
country, this amouts to saying that the CB does not react at all.
10national imbalances individually impose pure inﬂation targeting as the regime
that best allows to keep inﬂation under control.
4.4 Constraining ﬁscal policy
In Europe, the consideration that a monetary union may multiply the eﬀects of
any deﬁcit bias led to the establishment of the ﬁscal criteria in the Stability and
Growth Pact. The budgetary rules aim at tying the governments’ hands and
insulating the central bank from possible pressures arising from undisciplined
members of the union. The Pact states that the medium term budgetary po-
sition must be of “close to balance or in surplus”; automatic stabilizers would
be allowed to ﬂoat, but discretionary ﬁscal policy will not be possible. Hence,
g =0in our model.
Are ﬁscal constraints really necessary in a monetary union? The answer
provided by picture <<eﬀect on prices of a unitary shock>> shows that the
ﬁnal eﬀect on inﬂation of a shock can vary from the necessary ﬂexibility (in
case of a centralized labor market) to the very opposite, an increase in the ﬁnal
prices that further deteriorates the competitive position of the country aﬀected.
• <<eﬀect on prices of a unitary shock>>
The previous picture <<variance of prices after a unit shock>> conﬁrms
that the inﬂation is more diﬃcult to control in a MU than in the one country
case. The answer seems therefore decidedly positive.
Are ﬁscal criteria really helpful? Consider how ﬁscal policy aﬀects the dy-
namics of wages (with backward induction on the CB) and ex post monetary




= φ > 0 (16)
dw
dge =
(φ − 1)(−ω + ωλψ − λψ)
(ω − ωλψ + λψ)φα1λ + λ
2ψ
2 +( λψ − 1)
2 ω
> 0
Equations (16) show the fundamental role played by the constraints to ﬁscal
policy in allowing the central bank to control inﬂation. Removing the ﬁscal bias
inﬂuences both the ex post monetary policy and disciplines the ex ante wage
dynamics; the eﬀect is even larger if one considers that an unconstrained ﬁscal
policy would respond positively to wage inﬂation. One should notice that even
though the model has been built on symmetric loss functions for all the players,
the ﬁscal constraints become binding only on the inﬂationary side, and never
impede budget consolidation when necessary. The result of the ﬁscal constraints
is implicit coordination characterized by cyclically adjusted budgets in balance,
low interest rates and controlled inﬂation. Once again there is not an explicit
welfare analysis in the paper, but there is a strong consensus in the literature
(e.g. Nordhaus, 1994) that an equilibrium of sustainable ﬁscal policies and loose
11monetary policy is better than a combination of loose ﬁscal and tight monetary
policy.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The paper develops a model of policy interactions in a monetary union, focus-
ing on wage dynamics, ﬁscal and monetary activism and their consequences on
inﬂation. The simple and “optimistic”4 model is capable of grasping and explic-
iting the strategic interactions of the diﬀerent policymakers, and to highlight
some relevant problems that are central in the current policy debate:
• First and most important, ﬁscal activism is always increased by entry in
MU. This conclusion does not depend on any switch in preferences, and
should be considered as an inevitable fact for any country joining a MU.
• The capacity of the Central bank to keep inﬂation close to targets without
continuous interventions is much smaller in a MU than in the one country
case. Furthermore, the model shows that the unique monetary policy can
lead to very diﬀerent price dynamics in diﬀerent countries of the union. A
conservative central bank can reduce but not eliminate this problem.
• The eﬀects of the common monetary policy are inﬂuenced by the structure
of the national wage setting process. The model shows that some conver-
gence in the structure of labor markets may therefore be necessary. As a
general rule, decentralized wage bargaining produces higher wage inﬂation
and unemployment in the country and should not be encouraged.
• The good news for monetary unions is that ﬁscal constraints on the na-
tional ﬁscal budgets are eﬀective in re-establishing monetary dominance.
They also ensure an ex-post policy mix of stability-oriented monetary pol-
icy, sustainable ﬁscal policies and moderate wage inﬂation.
• From the methodological point of view, the paper takes into account the
structural break of the EMU and provides an analytical and conceptual
framework for assessing the potential causes for asymmetry in the MU.
The goal of the paper was not to take into account all possible factors, but to
disentangle a relevant mechanism of interaction among players which is typical
of a monetary union. There are, however, several ways in which the paper could
be developed. First, the analytical framework is extremely simpliﬁed and could
be enriched by adding sistematic biases for the national governments and the
unions, in order to obtain results that are valid for the steady state and not only
for the cyclical ﬂuctuations. Alternatively, the asymmetry in the preferences
of the governants in responding to a positive or a negative shock could be
explicitely modeled. Other relevant phenomena, such as international spillovers,
4The model is optimistic simply because the agents agree on the long run targets and their
preferences diﬀer on the degree of stabilization only.
12the exchange rate of the common currency, diﬀerences in tastes between the
countries, may aﬀect the results in various ways. These are interesting topics
for future research.
6 Appendix
Here I show the derivation of from a simple AD-AS framework with some prices
set in advance and rational expectations formed before the shocks are observed.
Demand and supply can be represented as:
yd = −p + φ(g − r)+ed (17)
p = ys + λw + es
w h e r ea l lt h ev a r i a b l e sa r ee x p r e s s e di nd i ﬀerence from targets (m,g,w)o rl o n g
run levels (y,p). The demand and supply shocks are ed and es, α and λ are
ﬁxed parameters.
which shows that the wage inﬂation is reﬂected on inﬂation, with a parameter
λ < 1, since wages are only one of the production factors in the economy.
The reduced form is obtained by solving for the equilibrium (yd = ys)a n d
rescaling the equations:
y = φ(g − r) − λw +( ed − es) (18)
p = φ(g − r)+λw +( ed + es)
After renaming the parameters, one obtains the ﬁnal equations (5).
137 Bibliography











Taylor rule vs. pure inflation targeting
Phi
V
a
r
(
b
e
t
a
=
1
/
3
)
 
-
 
V
a
r
(
b
e
t
a
=
0
)
14Figure 1:
Figure 2:
15Figure 3:
Figure 4:
16